Blog Layout

UPVC windows- development?

Roderick Morton • 27 November 2019

London Borough of Haringey v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and Paul Muir  [2019] EWHC 3000 (Admin)

Haringey Council brought a S.289 appeal against the decision of a planning inspector to allow an appeal against an enforcement notice issued by the Council.  

The notice, issued in May 2018, alleged “without planning permission, the installation of UPVC windows on the ground floor front elevation” of the Property. The Property was located within the Bowes Park Conservation Area.  It is the ground floor flat in the left hand house in the photo above.

The owner,, Mr Muir, lodged ground (c) and (f) appeals. In relation to the (c) appeal, it was not at issue that there was no planning permission or PD right.  The issue for the Inspector was whether the installation was development.

The statutory framework

Section 55 of the TCPA defines “development” for the purposes of the Act. S.55(2) sets out operations or activities which are not to be taken as development for the purposes of the Act. These include:

“(a)        the carrying out for the maintenance, improvement or other alteration of any building of works which…—

                                (ii)           do not materially affect the external appearance of the building.”

 ‘Building’ is defined at section 336 TCPA 1990:

                “Building” includes any structure or erection, and any part of a building, as so defined, but does not include plant or machinery, comprised in a building”

The inspector looked at two key issues; what was the building and what was the meaning of the phrase “materially affect the external appearance of the building”.

The inspector noted that there were a high number of UPVC windows along Myddleton and estimated that 90% of the front windows in the conservation area were UPVC. 49 Myddleton Road was a flat within a converted house, the house was  part of a terrace block of three similar properties; all windows at 51 and 53 were PVC and the second floor windows at 49 were PVC.

The Inspector referred to two cases in the Decision Letter; Church Commissioners v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 71 P&CR 73 and Burroughs Day v Bristol City Council [1996] 1 PLR 78.  Sadly, the judge concluded, he had confused himself on each.

He concluded that, while the PVC windows had a material effect on number 49, they did not have a material effect on the terrace block comprising numbers 49-53 due to the “pre-existing dominance” of PVC windows in that terrace.  He decided that this wider terrace building was the “building” in this case and therefore found that there was no development and upheld the appeal.

Haringey Council appealed on two grounds: the first was that the Inspector made an error in concluding that the “building” (for s55 purposes) was the block as a whole.  And second that the Inspector erred in assessing the impact of the new windows on the wider area, which was immaterial.

The Inspectorate agreed that the Inspector had misunderstood the Church Commissioners case.  But they said that the error was  not a material error; the Inspector had merely drawn parallels with that case.  He was entitled to find that the “building” was greater than the individual flat at number 49..

Mrs Justice Lieven found that the Inspector had misled himself on the  application of the Church Commissioners case.  That case (involving a unit in a shopping centre) was not primarily concerned with the question of what was a building for the purposes of S.55, but rather what was the planning unit in an argument over material change of use.

Similarly, the Inspector had been misled by the decision in the Burroughs Day case.  That judgment says that the effect of changes to a building must be considered by reference to the building overall, not to a part of it taken in isolation.  Mrs Justice Leiven said that, to the extent this was saying that the effect on a single part of a building could not be considered, it was plain wrong.

Ultimately, Mrs Justice Lieven preferred the ordinary meaning of the word “building”.  It was unusual, she thought, that the Inspector found that the building constituted an entire terrace rather than an individual property even though it was common practice for each house in a terrace to be considered to be a building and further where there were several listed buildings within a terrace, each separate house would usually be separately listed.  Mrs Justice Lieven observed that although this did not mean that the Inspector was wrong to find the whole terrace was a building, he should have given clear and adequate reasoning. That he didn’t suggested he had misunderstood the effect of the Church Commissioners case and his error was material to his decision.

On the second ground, it was clear to Mrs Justice Lieven that the Inspector had taken the wider area into account, and that it had a material impact on the Inspector’s conclusions.  She quoted part of the decision letter where the Inspector noted that, had more consistent action had been taken against the other UPVC window installations in the conservation area, the UPVC window on the ground floor at 49 would have had more of a material effect than it did at present.  Mrs Justice Lieven made clear that,  in working out whether something is development for  S.55(2 (a)(ii), the Inspector should not have had regard to anything other than the building itself.

It is hard not to feel sympathy for an Inspector who was asked to uphold an enforcement notice that was shutting the door to a stable from which the horses had long since bolted.  Perhaps if Mr Muir, the owner, had made a ground (a) appeal, the Inspector would not have had to stretch “development” beyond its natural meaning. As it was, he did stretch it and it snapped.  This case is a reminder that wording in legislation is usually given its ordinary meaning if it is possible to do so.

 

by Roderick Morton 17 October 2024
Jones vs Isle of Anglesey County Council and Another [2024][ EWHC 2582] (Admin)
by Izindi Visagie 11 October 2024
originally written for Scottish Planner
by Roderick Morton 19 September 2024
Warwick DC v SSLUGC and others [2022] EWHC 2145 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 27 August 2024
LB Richmond upon Thames v the King oao Owolabi Ariyo [2024] EXCA Civ 960
by Roderick Morton 23 July 2024
LB Lambeth v SSLUHC [2024] EWHC 1391
by Roderick Morton 6 June 2024
LB Barking and Dagenham v Zannat Ara Aziz [2024] EWHC 1212 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 16 May 2024
Caldwell and Timberstore v SSLUHC [2024] EWCA Civ 467
by Roderick Morton 26 April 2024
Ward v SSLUHC and Basildon District Council [2024] EWHC 676 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 22 March 2024
R oao Lisle-Mainwaring v RB Kensington and Chelsea and another
by Roderick Morton 13 February 2024
Southwood v Buckinghamshire Council [2024] EWHC 71 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 30 January 2024
s172ZA TCPA 1990
by Roderick Morton 26 October 2023
Ariyo v Richmond Upon Thames LBC [2023] EWHC 2278
Just what is the “streetscene” and the “character and appearance of an area”?
by Roderick Morton 28 September 2023
Kazalbash v SSLUHC and Hillingdon [2023] EWCA Civ 904
by Roderick Morton 7 August 2023
Removal of facilitating development
by Roderick Morton 19 July 2023
Pathfield Estates Ltd v LB Haringey [2023] EWHC 1790 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 28 June 2023
Given its portrayal of the planning system so far, it is almost a given that season 3 of Clarkson’s Farm will not accurately present the detail of the Diddly Squat appeal decision. Here is our take. The decision is here. In summary, the LPA won almost all of the enforcement points. But simply being Jeremy Clarkson is apparently a material consideration which alters the planning balance! While he is popular, his celebrity is such that his farm shop will create significant problems beyond those of an ordinary farm shop and the inspector decided that these are problems which have already been accepted in granting his existing permission. Fewer of the harms to the AONB can therefore be attributed to the additional elements of the use. And these harms are outweighed by the economic benefits, benefits which are a result of his celebrity. So permission was granted for his farm shop and café and the associated parking and toilets. Clarkson’s popularity will be re-assessed in 3 years as the permission is time limited. Perhaps the inspector knows something we don’t. As viewers will know, Clarkson’s Farm operates in open countryside in an AONB. As well as agriculture, it has diversified to include a farm shop and a café in a lambing barn. The business tried to open a restaurant in a converted barn located some distance from the shop. The site is obviously used as a filming location. The business has proved popular and it now has significant parking and highway problems. The farm shop (with limited parking) has permission, the construction of the lambing barn (but not its use) has permission and there is permission for limited filming. The council enforced against the material change of use of the land to a mixed agricultural and leisure attraction use, comprising café, restaurant, gift/farm shop, parking and lavatory facilities. The notice was appealed. The appellant also sought (and was refused) permission for additional parking, access, storage and landscaping. This appeal was heard alongside the enforcement appeal. The inspector dealt first with the planning unit. The appellant alleged that there were three separate planning units (shop, café, restaurant), with each having a separate primary use. The council had enforced against a single unit in a mixed use. The inspector took into account that the shop/café was in a different ownership to the farm and that it had its own permission. But its activities clearly spilled out of the permitted area, extending to the proposed restaurant and the wider parking areas. The restaurant used the same parking as the shop. These were fenced/walled off from the remainder of the farm. He concluded that there was a single planning unit. As for the use of that planning unit, the inspector took issue with several items listed by the council. “Gift shop” was too ambiguous; a shop is a shop. Similarly, while visitors no doubt came for the experience, the business was not a “leisure attraction”. A leisure attraction required, said the inspector, something which the customer might be expected to pay for. There was no entrance fee here, just a shop and café. (It appears that the inspector was also concerned that any permission for a “leisure attraction” would create a very wide lawful use.) Nevertheless, there were several primary uses in a single unit so the development was a mixed use, in this case a “mixed use comprising agriculture, café, restaurant, farm shop, parking, lavatory facilities.” This put paid to the ground (b) and (c) challenges. The challenge was that the restaurant was a separate planning unit. As it was in the curtilage of the lawful farm shop, the appellant said that Class R permitted a change of use to a flexible use including a restaurant. In the light of his conclusion on the planning unit, the inspector rejected this. He said he would have rejected the Class R argument anyway as the restaurant was not clearly within the curtilage of the farm shop. The remainder of the uses cited in the notice were also challenged on the grounds that they were ancillary to the lawful farm shop use and not primary uses. The inspector concluded that, as the restaurant resulted in a mixed use, there had been a material change of use so it was irrelevant whether the other items were ancillary. As an aside, viewers of the series will recall the scripted glee with which the appellant came up with the “PD loophole” for his restaurant. It is fitting, therefore, that it was the restaurant which was the primary reason the breach was upheld. The inspector nevertheless looked at the extent to which the various alleged ancillary elements (other than the restaurant) were part of the lawful use prior to the breach. This was relevant to the fallback but also to what the extent of the material change of use truly was. He identified that the question was whether any of the elements represented a change in the character of the use. The inspector found that the level or vehicle traffic and parking went far beyond that for which permission had been given. And that the lambing shed was clearly not “by any stretch of reasonableness” being used for the purpose for which it was given permission. Even the toilet facilities went beyond what would be expected for the permitted farm shop. This was not intensification, it was a material change in the character of the use. The LPA even won the merits arguments on ground (a). The number of visitors, the traffic and parking problems, the outdoor seating, catering van and toilets clearly had an adverse effect on the AONB. The parking and landscaping proposed under the s78 application would have a similar effect. This had great weight. In the end though, permission was granted for the mixed use, including the use of the lambing shed as a café and the enforced against parking and toilets. Permission was granted under the s78 appeal for altered parking, storage and landscaping. Only the restaurant was refused. The inspector found that the parking would alleviate the current parking situation and highway safety even though it would not provide a complete solution. He accepted that a number of local suppliers benefited from trading arrangements with the shop and that the shop contributed to the local economy. He accepted that diversification was to be supported. These considerations also had great weight. Key to the decision, though, was the fact that permission had been granted, not just for a farm shop, but for a celebrity’s farm shop. Even if there was no café or restaurant, the popularity of the appellant was such that people would continue to visit the shop in numbers. This reduced to moderate the harm to the AONB caused by the new elements of the use because the permitted use already resulted in significant harm. The appellant’s celebrity might wane. In which case, the weight of the considerations in favour of the development would wane. The permission granted was therefore time limited to 36 months. The decision is well reasoned and fairly logical. The inspector did not say that the character of the use already permitted varied with the identity of the user. But the result seems to imply that the harms associated with the use could vary and that the LPA had accepted them all in granting permission. Yet it is difficult to think that the LPA could successfully have imposed conditions on the farm shop based on the identity of the applicant. The result is therefore troubling.
by Roderick Morton 17 May 2023
R oao Devonhurst Investments Ltd v Luton Borough Council [2023] EWHC 978 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 25 April 2023
Muorah v SSHCLG and Brent [2023] EWHC 285 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 24 March 2023
Atwill v New Forest NPA [2023] EWHC 625 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 23 February 2023
McCaffrey v Dartmoor NPA [2023] 2 WLUK 341
by Roderick Morton 17 January 2023
Welwyn Hatfield BC v SSLUHC and Kabala [2022] EWHC 3175 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 22 November 2022
Hillside Parks Ltd v Snowdonia National Park Authority [2022] UKSC 30
by Roderick Morton 26 October 2022
LB Hackney vs JC Decaux (UK) Ltd [2022] EWHC 2621 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 18 August 2022
LB Brent v SSLUHC and Yehuda Rothchild [2022] EWHC 2051 (Admin)
Share by: