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Failure to serve

Roderick Morton • 6 June 2024

This month’s case is a High Court appeal by way of case stated from a decision of Magistrates to acquit a defendant on a charge of failing to comply with an enforcement notice. The case illustrates the breadth of the points which can be raised before the Magistrates if the defendant is not served with the notice.


We don’t know the full background to the case; it is not recorded in the judgment and the court only had a summary. However, the Magistrates found, as facts, that the defendant had an interest in the property at the time of the notice but she was not served and did not otherwise know of the notice. While the notice was on the s188 register, the defendant could not reasonably have been expected to know of its existence and, having been unaware of its existence, she was prejudiced by being unable to bring an appeal in time (or at all).


The normal rule under s285 TCPA 1990 is that the validity of an enforcement notice can only be challenged on appeal before an inspector. If not challenged, it can’t be challenged in court. However, this is subject to an exception (the “statutory disapplication”) in s285(2) where the defendant was not served, did not know of the notice and suffered prejudice as a result. 


Failure to serve a notice properly is a ground of appeal (ground (e)). If upheld, the notice is quashed and cannot form the basis of a prosecution.  The Magistrates found that was the case here. and acquitted the defendant. The council challenged the decision to acquit. 


The council argued that, since the notice was on the statutory register and since there was a duty of vigilance on landowners to be aware of registered matters affecting their land, it could not be said that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the notice. This was rejected by the court. The legislation is clear that registration is not fatal to the statutory disapplication (in contrast to the s179 defence). It is not reasonable to expect a landowner to constantly check the s188 register. It is, however, reasonable to expect an incoming purchaser to check that register. 


The council also argued that, as the defendant had applied for an HMO licence sometime after the notice was issued, she should then have checked the s188 register. The court said that this was not one of the questions asked by the Magistrates but that, on the limited facts before the court, it did not seem unreasonable for the Magistrates to have discounted this in coming to their conclusion that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the notice.


The appellant argued that, the statutory disapplication having been made out, that was a complete defence. However, the court held that it was merely the gateway to a challenge to the validity of the notice on one of the grounds of appeal (a) to (g). 


The council argued that a challenge based on ground (e) was not a challenge to the “validity” of a notice; only grounds (c) and (d) appeal grounds “went to the heart of the notice” in a manner sufficient to be a challenge to validity for s285 purposes. This was rejected by the court. If the statutory disapplication applies, then the defendant can make any points that would have been made at inspector appeal i.e. anything in grounds (a) to (g). 


The defendant makes these ground (a) to (g) points at before the Magistrates, rather than an inspector. So the trial becomes a mini-inquiry, which is unusual. Nevertheless, that is the way the legislation works.


What happens if the Magistrates find in favour of the defendant, as they did here? The decision, the court confirmed, is simply that the defendant is acquitted. The notice itself still stands.

The defendant is acquitted because the notice would have been found invalid had it been appealed before an inspector but, as it wasn’t appealed, it remains in force. It is an interesting question whether the notice is a true chocolate teapot on which no-one could be prosecuted or whether there are circumstances in which a different defendant (one who had knowledge of the notice) could still be prosecuted despite the substantial prejudice to the current defendant. 


The problem with this decision is a point which was not, it seems, fully considered. The court seems to have accepted that, had the defendant made a ground (e) appeal, she would automatically have been successful and the notice would have been quashed. It was not necessary for her to demonstrate that failure to serve resulted in invalidity of the notice because, while under ground (e) an inspector can disregard failure to serve, that is only where there is no substantial prejudice. Here, the court said, substantial prejudice was “built in”. This part of the court’s decision does not quite ring true; many inspectors, faced with an appellant who claimed not to have been served, would say that since the appeal has in fact been made, there is no prejudice. There is no obvious reason why the Magistrates could not consider whether there is actual prejudice when conducting their mini inquiry under ground (e). Sadly, it seems that the point was not taken before the Magistrates so was not available in the High Court.


The facts of the case are perhaps unusual; few prosecutions would be brought against someone who appears truly to have been unaware of a notice. It is more likely that such a person would be informed of the notice, asked to comply and, if they failed to do so, prosecuted only for the period after being informed. Nevertheless, the court was clear that, where a defendant is truly unaware of the notice, the council can expect the trial to cover anything that could be raised at appeal. 



One final point to remember is that this decision does not apply to those who become landowners after the notice; they are expected to check the s188 register so will have knowledge of the notice. 

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Given its portrayal of the planning system so far, it is almost a given that season 3 of Clarkson’s Farm will not accurately present the detail of the Diddly Squat appeal decision. Here is our take. The decision is here. In summary, the LPA won almost all of the enforcement points. But simply being Jeremy Clarkson is apparently a material consideration which alters the planning balance! While he is popular, his celebrity is such that his farm shop will create significant problems beyond those of an ordinary farm shop and the inspector decided that these are problems which have already been accepted in granting his existing permission. Fewer of the harms to the AONB can therefore be attributed to the additional elements of the use. And these harms are outweighed by the economic benefits, benefits which are a result of his celebrity. So permission was granted for his farm shop and café and the associated parking and toilets. Clarkson’s popularity will be re-assessed in 3 years as the permission is time limited. Perhaps the inspector knows something we don’t. As viewers will know, Clarkson’s Farm operates in open countryside in an AONB. As well as agriculture, it has diversified to include a farm shop and a café in a lambing barn. The business tried to open a restaurant in a converted barn located some distance from the shop. The site is obviously used as a filming location. The business has proved popular and it now has significant parking and highway problems. The farm shop (with limited parking) has permission, the construction of the lambing barn (but not its use) has permission and there is permission for limited filming. The council enforced against the material change of use of the land to a mixed agricultural and leisure attraction use, comprising café, restaurant, gift/farm shop, parking and lavatory facilities. The notice was appealed. The appellant also sought (and was refused) permission for additional parking, access, storage and landscaping. This appeal was heard alongside the enforcement appeal. The inspector dealt first with the planning unit. The appellant alleged that there were three separate planning units (shop, café, restaurant), with each having a separate primary use. The council had enforced against a single unit in a mixed use. The inspector took into account that the shop/café was in a different ownership to the farm and that it had its own permission. But its activities clearly spilled out of the permitted area, extending to the proposed restaurant and the wider parking areas. The restaurant used the same parking as the shop. These were fenced/walled off from the remainder of the farm. He concluded that there was a single planning unit. As for the use of that planning unit, the inspector took issue with several items listed by the council. “Gift shop” was too ambiguous; a shop is a shop. Similarly, while visitors no doubt came for the experience, the business was not a “leisure attraction”. A leisure attraction required, said the inspector, something which the customer might be expected to pay for. There was no entrance fee here, just a shop and café. (It appears that the inspector was also concerned that any permission for a “leisure attraction” would create a very wide lawful use.) Nevertheless, there were several primary uses in a single unit so the development was a mixed use, in this case a “mixed use comprising agriculture, café, restaurant, farm shop, parking, lavatory facilities.” This put paid to the ground (b) and (c) challenges. The challenge was that the restaurant was a separate planning unit. As it was in the curtilage of the lawful farm shop, the appellant said that Class R permitted a change of use to a flexible use including a restaurant. In the light of his conclusion on the planning unit, the inspector rejected this. He said he would have rejected the Class R argument anyway as the restaurant was not clearly within the curtilage of the farm shop. The remainder of the uses cited in the notice were also challenged on the grounds that they were ancillary to the lawful farm shop use and not primary uses. The inspector concluded that, as the restaurant resulted in a mixed use, there had been a material change of use so it was irrelevant whether the other items were ancillary. As an aside, viewers of the series will recall the scripted glee with which the appellant came up with the “PD loophole” for his restaurant. It is fitting, therefore, that it was the restaurant which was the primary reason the breach was upheld. The inspector nevertheless looked at the extent to which the various alleged ancillary elements (other than the restaurant) were part of the lawful use prior to the breach. This was relevant to the fallback but also to what the extent of the material change of use truly was. He identified that the question was whether any of the elements represented a change in the character of the use. The inspector found that the level or vehicle traffic and parking went far beyond that for which permission had been given. And that the lambing shed was clearly not “by any stretch of reasonableness” being used for the purpose for which it was given permission. Even the toilet facilities went beyond what would be expected for the permitted farm shop. This was not intensification, it was a material change in the character of the use. The LPA even won the merits arguments on ground (a). The number of visitors, the traffic and parking problems, the outdoor seating, catering van and toilets clearly had an adverse effect on the AONB. The parking and landscaping proposed under the s78 application would have a similar effect. This had great weight. In the end though, permission was granted for the mixed use, including the use of the lambing shed as a café and the enforced against parking and toilets. Permission was granted under the s78 appeal for altered parking, storage and landscaping. Only the restaurant was refused. The inspector found that the parking would alleviate the current parking situation and highway safety even though it would not provide a complete solution. He accepted that a number of local suppliers benefited from trading arrangements with the shop and that the shop contributed to the local economy. He accepted that diversification was to be supported. These considerations also had great weight. Key to the decision, though, was the fact that permission had been granted, not just for a farm shop, but for a celebrity’s farm shop. Even if there was no café or restaurant, the popularity of the appellant was such that people would continue to visit the shop in numbers. This reduced to moderate the harm to the AONB caused by the new elements of the use because the permitted use already resulted in significant harm. The appellant’s celebrity might wane. In which case, the weight of the considerations in favour of the development would wane. The permission granted was therefore time limited to 36 months. The decision is well reasoned and fairly logical. The inspector did not say that the character of the use already permitted varied with the identity of the user. But the result seems to imply that the harms associated with the use could vary and that the LPA had accepted them all in granting permission. Yet it is difficult to think that the LPA could successfully have imposed conditions on the farm shop based on the identity of the applicant. The result is therefore troubling.
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