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Implementation of planning permission

Roderick Morton • 24 March 2023

In 2018, a developer obtained permission for a new house in the National Park, to be built following demolition of an existing one. Demolition took place but the house which was built was very different from the permission. A neighbour complained. The NPA issued an enforcement notice requiring demolition. It was appealed and the appeal is pending. In the meantime, the NPA allowed the developer to seek retrospective permission under s73 TCPA 1990 for what was built; the application was made more than 3 years after the grant of permission but the council accepted the demolition as implementing the permission.  The council granted permission, subject to a lapse condition.


The neighbour challenged the council’s decision to grant permission. There were 7 grounds but only a couple are of interest in enforcement terms.


The neighbour argued that the 2018 permission was not implemented. As such it had lapsed. It could not now physically be implemented in any case. As it had lapsed, no s73 permission could be granted as s73 does not permit the extension of time to implement. The neighbour also argued that the council was wrong to call it a minor material amendment and that it was clearly outside the scope of s73. The council’s failure to reattach all relevant conditions from the 2018 permission to the s73 permission was also attacked.


As a reminder, s73 allows applications for permission for development without compliance with conditions to a previous permission. While often referred to as minor material amendments, those words are not part of s73. In most cases, the condition which is to be varied is the plans condition but, again, there is no such limit in s73. 


It is self-evident that if there is no permission (eg because it had lapsed), there is no condition and no scope for s73 to operate. 


Implementation of a permission is usually required within 3 years, otherwise it lapses. Implementation of an operational development permission takes place when development begins. S56 provides that development begins when a “material operation comprised in the development” is carried out. Material operation has a very wide definition and includes demolition or “any work of construction in the course of erection of a building”. But where what is built is too different from the permission, the material operation was not one “comprised in the development” authorised by the permission.   In such cases, the developer doesn’t implement the permission, they implement something else.


In this case, the judge decided that while demolition took place in time, what was eventually built was so different to what was permitted that the demolition could not be said to be related to the permission. The development was not implemented, the permission therefore lapsed and there was no scope for a s73 application. 


This shouldn’t be surprising since the clear basis of the enforcement notice is that what was built was not an implementation of the permission; indeed that was the NPA’s case to the pending enforcement appeal. It was odd, then, that that the NPA was arguing in favour of implementation in these proceedings.  Perhaps this was the reason the judge was willing to rule on what might otherwise be considered a matter of planning judgment.


The judge also found that the 2018 permission was unimplementable due to the way in which the new house had been built. While this was, she said, normally a matter of planning judgement, the evidence was so overwhelming that the NPA’s failure to take it into account vitiated the decision to grant permission.


A final ground which is of interest is the scope of s73. The recent case of Armstrong v SSLUHC [2023] EWHC 176 was cited. That case reminded us that s73 is about conditions, not whether the variation is minor. The PPG guidance was wrong on that score. The neighbour’s challenge that the council was wrong to call this a minor material amendment failed as it was irrelevant. However, where the s73 application seeks to change the “operative part” of the earlier permission (ie the actual grant of permission), it cannot be granted. Here, at least one element of the s73 application was outside the scope of the original permission.



From an enforcement perspective, the case is a useful reminder of the need to check implementation carefully where a developer claims to have permission. It is also a reminder of the limitations of s73. It is not unusual for a revised application to be invited as an alternative to formal enforcement action. Quite who decided to make that application a s73 one in this case is not recorded in the decision. It is not game over for the developer though as the enforcement appeal includes a ground (a) appeal for what was built. 

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Clarkson’s popularity will be re-assessed in 3 years as the permission is time limited. Perhaps the inspector knows something we don’t. As viewers will know, Clarkson’s Farm operates in open countryside in an AONB. As well as agriculture, it has diversified to include a farm shop and a café in a lambing barn. The business tried to open a restaurant in a converted barn located some distance from the shop. The site is obviously used as a filming location. The business has proved popular and it now has significant parking and highway problems. The farm shop (with limited parking) has permission, the construction of the lambing barn (but not its use) has permission and there is permission for limited filming. The council enforced against the material change of use of the land to a mixed agricultural and leisure attraction use, comprising café, restaurant, gift/farm shop, parking and lavatory facilities. The notice was appealed. The appellant also sought (and was refused) permission for additional parking, access, storage and landscaping. This appeal was heard alongside the enforcement appeal. The inspector dealt first with the planning unit. The appellant alleged that there were three separate planning units (shop, café, restaurant), with each having a separate primary use. The council had enforced against a single unit in a mixed use. The inspector took into account that the shop/café was in a different ownership to the farm and that it had its own permission. But its activities clearly spilled out of the permitted area, extending to the proposed restaurant and the wider parking areas. The restaurant used the same parking as the shop. These were fenced/walled off from the remainder of the farm. He concluded that there was a single planning unit. As for the use of that planning unit, the inspector took issue with several items listed by the council. “Gift shop” was too ambiguous; a shop is a shop. Similarly, while visitors no doubt came for the experience, the business was not a “leisure attraction”. A leisure attraction required, said the inspector, something which the customer might be expected to pay for. There was no entrance fee here, just a shop and café. (It appears that the inspector was also concerned that any permission for a “leisure attraction” would create a very wide lawful use.) Nevertheless, there were several primary uses in a single unit so the development was a mixed use, in this case a “mixed use comprising agriculture, café, restaurant, farm shop, parking, lavatory facilities.” This put paid to the ground (b) and (c) challenges. The challenge was that the restaurant was a separate planning unit. As it was in the curtilage of the lawful farm shop, the appellant said that Class R permitted a change of use to a flexible use including a restaurant. In the light of his conclusion on the planning unit, the inspector rejected this. He said he would have rejected the Class R argument anyway as the restaurant was not clearly within the curtilage of the farm shop. The remainder of the uses cited in the notice were also challenged on the grounds that they were ancillary to the lawful farm shop use and not primary uses. The inspector concluded that, as the restaurant resulted in a mixed use, there had been a material change of use so it was irrelevant whether the other items were ancillary. As an aside, viewers of the series will recall the scripted glee with which the appellant came up with the “PD loophole” for his restaurant. It is fitting, therefore, that it was the restaurant which was the primary reason the breach was upheld. The inspector nevertheless looked at the extent to which the various alleged ancillary elements (other than the restaurant) were part of the lawful use prior to the breach. This was relevant to the fallback but also to what the extent of the material change of use truly was. He identified that the question was whether any of the elements represented a change in the character of the use. The inspector found that the level or vehicle traffic and parking went far beyond that for which permission had been given. And that the lambing shed was clearly not “by any stretch of reasonableness” being used for the purpose for which it was given permission. Even the toilet facilities went beyond what would be expected for the permitted farm shop. This was not intensification, it was a material change in the character of the use. The LPA even won the merits arguments on ground (a). The number of visitors, the traffic and parking problems, the outdoor seating, catering van and toilets clearly had an adverse effect on the AONB. The parking and landscaping proposed under the s78 application would have a similar effect. This had great weight. 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