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Man-Shed Miscalculated

Roderick Morton • 19 November 2021

Wildin v Forest of Dean DC [2021] EWCA Civ 1610



In our September and October articles, we looked at the process of getting injunctions and the guidance offered by the courts in recent decisions involving Hackney LBC, National Highways and Havering BC (and others).

This month, we look at the latest decision in the Wildin case, which involves the appeal of an order for committal after an injunction and which was decided earlier this month. 

Fast overtaking Mr Fidler as planning enforcement’s cause celebre, readers will recall that Mr Wildin is an accountant who, in 2013, began to construct a large sports building in the rear garden of his two adjoining houses, first having excavated the site so that he could claim it was single storey and therefore (he thought) PD. The building would ultimately contain a sports hall, gym, squash court, cinema, two ten-pin bowling lanes, a casino, bar and soft play. 

The council served an enforcement notice in 2014, before construction was complete, and the notice was largely upheld by an inspector in 2015. Mr Wildin completed and furnished the building anyway and took no action to comply with the enforcement notice. His appeal against the inspector’s decision was rejected by the High Court in 2015. Expiry of the compliance period came and went and, in 2018, the council obtained an injunction requiring compliance with the notice and also requiring completion of certain “stepping stones” to compliance, such as signing a contract with a contractor, decommissioning services and soft stripping the interior. The judge who granted the injunction even made a site visit. Not one to keep it low key, Mr Wildin ensured that people were playing squash, bowling and using the cinema at the time of the site visit!

The injunction was appealed but the appeal was rejected. Appeal judge Irwin LJ said that Mr Wildin was “the owner of his own misfortune”.

Mr Wildin still did not comply and, in 2021, the council obtained an order of committal for contempt of court for failure to comply with the injunction. The committal was for some, but not all, of the injunction failures (largely the “stepping stone” items); the committal judge accepted that there was insufficient evidence that Mr Wildin had sufficient money to comply with the injunction in full, particularly as regards full demolition. Mr Wildin was sentenced to 6 weeks in prison. But the sentence was suspended for 12 months on condition that he completed the stepping stone steps within a new timetable.

Mr Wildin did not comply. Instead, he appealed the sentence. With a hearing date for the appeal set, Mr Wildin started on the soft-strip, removing a few pictures, a mirror and some doors. And so we come to the current iteration of this case.

Mr Wildin appealed his sentence on several grounds. He suggested that, as this was a mandatory injunction (requiring positive action rather than prohibiting action), the council had to allege and prove that Mr Wildin could afford to carry out the works. He also suggested that the requirements of the injunction were not severable and that, unless he failed to do all of them, he could not be guilty of contempt; so having started on the soft-strip, he could not be entirely contemptuous of the court’s order. Finally, he said that the judge was wrong to find that he was able to afford to do some of the work because the only information on that was in an affidavit which Mr Wildin had submitted but not used at the injunction hearing. There were other grounds of appeal. 

The first of these points is the point of general importance here. As mentioned, the committal judge had accepted that there was no evidence that Mr Wildin was able to afford to complete some items on the injunction order (ie full demolition). The contempt application was dismissed on those items and, at appeal, the council did not argue that this was wrong. But the Court of Appeal refused to endorse that approach. It pointed out that the council could never prove Mr Wildin’s wealth to a “beyond reasonable doubt” standard since the facts were in Mr Wildin’s exclusive knowledge. It was, said the Court of Appeal, for Mr Wildin to prove that he could not afford to comply.  Ability to afford the work was a defence to contempt, not an element of the contempt. 

The inference was that the committal judge could perhaps have granted the committal in respect of all the items of the failures to comply with the injunction. Since the point was not appealed, the Court of Appeal could not overturn the decision. Mr Wildin was, said the court “extremely fortunate… the outcome on the issue of his wealth was very favourable to [Mr Wildin], perhaps wrongly so”. But it meant that Mr Wildin’s argument, that he could not afford to comply with the stepping stone items either, was given short shrift.

The argument about the council needing to prove non-compliance with all injunction items was given equally short shrift. The court held that the injunction terms were severable. If Mr Wildin complied with some, but not all, of the terms, he could still be in contempt in relation to the remainder.

The decision, then, is helpful in providing very clear precedent against some of the obstacles which defendants seek to put in the way of committal. The road is also now, presumably, open to the council to seek Mr Wildin’s committal on the remainder of the injunction. It would be nice to think that the prospect of some prison time would be enough to encourage his compliance but, given the history of the case, that may be wishful thinking.


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Clarkson’s popularity will be re-assessed in 3 years as the permission is time limited. Perhaps the inspector knows something we don’t. As viewers will know, Clarkson’s Farm operates in open countryside in an AONB. As well as agriculture, it has diversified to include a farm shop and a café in a lambing barn. The business tried to open a restaurant in a converted barn located some distance from the shop. The site is obviously used as a filming location. The business has proved popular and it now has significant parking and highway problems. The farm shop (with limited parking) has permission, the construction of the lambing barn (but not its use) has permission and there is permission for limited filming. The council enforced against the material change of use of the land to a mixed agricultural and leisure attraction use, comprising café, restaurant, gift/farm shop, parking and lavatory facilities. The notice was appealed. The appellant also sought (and was refused) permission for additional parking, access, storage and landscaping. This appeal was heard alongside the enforcement appeal. The inspector dealt first with the planning unit. The appellant alleged that there were three separate planning units (shop, café, restaurant), with each having a separate primary use. The council had enforced against a single unit in a mixed use. The inspector took into account that the shop/café was in a different ownership to the farm and that it had its own permission. But its activities clearly spilled out of the permitted area, extending to the proposed restaurant and the wider parking areas. The restaurant used the same parking as the shop. These were fenced/walled off from the remainder of the farm. He concluded that there was a single planning unit. As for the use of that planning unit, the inspector took issue with several items listed by the council. “Gift shop” was too ambiguous; a shop is a shop. Similarly, while visitors no doubt came for the experience, the business was not a “leisure attraction”. A leisure attraction required, said the inspector, something which the customer might be expected to pay for. There was no entrance fee here, just a shop and café. (It appears that the inspector was also concerned that any permission for a “leisure attraction” would create a very wide lawful use.) Nevertheless, there were several primary uses in a single unit so the development was a mixed use, in this case a “mixed use comprising agriculture, café, restaurant, farm shop, parking, lavatory facilities.” This put paid to the ground (b) and (c) challenges. The challenge was that the restaurant was a separate planning unit. As it was in the curtilage of the lawful farm shop, the appellant said that Class R permitted a change of use to a flexible use including a restaurant. In the light of his conclusion on the planning unit, the inspector rejected this. He said he would have rejected the Class R argument anyway as the restaurant was not clearly within the curtilage of the farm shop. The remainder of the uses cited in the notice were also challenged on the grounds that they were ancillary to the lawful farm shop use and not primary uses. The inspector concluded that, as the restaurant resulted in a mixed use, there had been a material change of use so it was irrelevant whether the other items were ancillary. As an aside, viewers of the series will recall the scripted glee with which the appellant came up with the “PD loophole” for his restaurant. It is fitting, therefore, that it was the restaurant which was the primary reason the breach was upheld. The inspector nevertheless looked at the extent to which the various alleged ancillary elements (other than the restaurant) were part of the lawful use prior to the breach. This was relevant to the fallback but also to what the extent of the material change of use truly was. He identified that the question was whether any of the elements represented a change in the character of the use. The inspector found that the level or vehicle traffic and parking went far beyond that for which permission had been given. And that the lambing shed was clearly not “by any stretch of reasonableness” being used for the purpose for which it was given permission. Even the toilet facilities went beyond what would be expected for the permitted farm shop. This was not intensification, it was a material change in the character of the use. The LPA even won the merits arguments on ground (a). The number of visitors, the traffic and parking problems, the outdoor seating, catering van and toilets clearly had an adverse effect on the AONB. The parking and landscaping proposed under the s78 application would have a similar effect. This had great weight. 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This reduced to moderate the harm to the AONB caused by the new elements of the use because the permitted use already resulted in significant harm. The appellant’s celebrity might wane. In which case, the weight of the considerations in favour of the development would wane. The permission granted was therefore time limited to 36 months. The decision is well reasoned and fairly logical. The inspector did not say that the character of the use already permitted varied with the identity of the user. But the result seems to imply that the harms associated with the use could vary and that the LPA had accepted them all in granting permission. Yet it is difficult to think that the LPA could successfully have imposed conditions on the farm shop based on the identity of the applicant. The result is therefore troubling.
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