When is a dwellinghouse not a dwellinghouse?

Roderick Morton • 4 June 2026

A developer changed the use of a dwellinghouse to an HMO and a flat. The council enforced against it. The notice was quashed on ground (b) on the basis that the building was in fact in use as a single HMO. A subsequent enforcement notice alleged the conversion of two flats to a single HMO. At appeal, the inspector found that the HMO development was not immune from enforcement action as it had not continued for 10 years (as required by s171B(3)) and also because there may have been a second bite option under s171B(4). The inspector said nothing about whether s171B(2) TCPA 1990 (“change of use to use as a single dwellinghouse” - in its pre-LURA 4 year form) might apply; this was not surprising as the developer had conceded it did not.


At appeal to the High Court, the developer argued that s171B(2) applied because “use as a single dwellinghouse” in s171B(2) included use as an HMO because an HMO is a type of dwellinghouse.


The High Court found that the application of s171B(2) was a new point which was not raised before the inspector and could not now be raised at the High Court; the appeal was therefore dismissed. To that extent, the rest of the judgment is obiter and will carry less weight.  This is a pity because the judge had some interesting things to say about whether s171B(2) applied.


The court went back to Hansard (the record of all things said in parliament) to look at the 1968 parliamentary debate around the introduction of the 4 year immunity rule for use as single dwellinghouse. The Minister who introduced the legislation made clear that it was not intended to capture “multi-occupation” as such uses could have “undesirable social as well as planning consequences”… “it would not be wise to subject such a breach to the constraint of the four year rule”.


This passage had been rejected as “not determinative” in the 1993 Court of Appeal case of Van Dyck[1] which found that the four year rule under s171B(2) applied to conversion of a building to several flats because each flat was a separate single dwelling. But the High Court in this case distinguished Van Dyck as being related to a different point (subdivision rather than multi-occupation). The court in this case found the 1968 Minister’s remarks were admissible as a guide to construction of s171B(2).

 

The appellant pointed to class L of the GPDO which describes options to convert C3 buildings to C4 use but which restricts multi-unit conversions in relation to “any building previously used as a single dwellinghouse falling within Class C4.” That wording rather suggests that a C4 HMO can be used as a single dwellinghouse. This, the court decided, could not be used as an aid to construction of s171B(2) because it was not contemporaneous with s171B(2), coming some 40 years afterwards.


The SoS pointed to Annex 2 to Circular 10/97 which excluded HMO use from use as a single dwellinghouse for s171B(2). This was admissible as guidance as to the government’s view, said the judge, but not definitive. The same could be said for the guidance in the Inspectors’ Training Manual.


In Brent[2], the court decided that a C4 HMO could be a dwellinghouse (“for the purposes of the GPDO or otherwise”); the only test was the Gravesham one. That is not surprising; Class C4 is defined as “use of a dwellinghouse…as a house in multiple occupation.”


But being a dwellinghouse and being used as a dwellinghouse are two separate tests. And the test in s171B(2) is use as a single dwellinghouse. It was this latter question that the rest of the decision considered.


As mentioned, Van Dyck was distinguished. The court in that case had been concerned with multiple flats, not a single unit in multiple occupation. It had been conceded in that case that the four year rule did not apply to multiple occupation.


The court made clear that the word “single” matters. It does not restrict the number of dwellinghouses (per Van Dyck) but it does require that each dwellinghouse is in use as a single dwellinghouse and not in multiple occupation. 


As the court spelled out at paragraph 108


“For these reasons, the words “use as a single dwellinghouse” as they appear in section 171B(2) TCPA 1990 do not include an HMO, and therefore the Inspector did not err by referring to the “…10 year period required to achieve immunity…”


It remains to be seen whether this will be appealed. The judge was alive to the possibility, observing that, even if he was wrong on the interpretation, he would still have dismissed the appeal.


While the problem is time limited by LURA’s resetting all immunity periods to 10 years, there remain plenty of transitional provision cases which will be affected by this decision.


Where does this leave Van Dyck? Sadly, it remains good law despite running roughshod over planning units, ministerial statements and, in some cases, common sense. The judge spent no small effort distinguishing it in this ruling.



A more interesting question is where it leaves Class L. Class L permitted development still remains (the permission relates to a “building”, not a “dwellinghouse”. But the application of the limitations must now be in some doubt; how could any building now be said to have previously been in use as a “single dwellinghouse falling within Class C4” so as to engage that limitation?  Does that mean multi-unit HMO conversions are now possible under Class L?  


 
[1] Doncaster BC and Van Dyck v SSE [1993] 66 P&CR 61

[2] London Borough of Brent v SSLHC [2022] EWHC 2051

by Roderick Morton 27 March 2026
Titchfield Festival Theatre v SSHCLG and Fareham BC [2026] EWHC Civ 36
by Roderick Morton 26 September 2025
R v Williams and Cyngor Gwynedd [2025/ EWHC 2395 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 14 August 2025
Singhal UK Ltd v SSLUHC and Hounslow LBC [2025] EWHC 1967 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 24 July 2025
Nicastro v The Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 00706 (GRC)
by Roderick Morton 25 April 2025
Titchfield Festival Theatre v SSHCLG and Fareham BC [2025] EWHC 883 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 13 February 2025
Paton v SSLUHC and Maldon DC [2025] EWHC 245 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 25 November 2024
Amber Valley BC v Haytop Country Park Ltd [2024] UKUT 237 (LC)
by Roderick Morton 17 October 2024
Jones vs Isle of Anglesey County Council and Another [2024][ EWHC 2582] (Admin)
by Izindi Visagie 11 October 2024
originally written for Scottish Planner
by Roderick Morton 19 September 2024
Warwick DC v SSLUGC and others [2022] EWHC 2145 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 27 August 2024
LB Richmond upon Thames v the King oao Owolabi Ariyo [2024] EXCA Civ 960
by Roderick Morton 23 July 2024
LB Lambeth v SSLUHC [2024] EWHC 1391
by Roderick Morton 6 June 2024
LB Barking and Dagenham v Zannat Ara Aziz [2024] EWHC 1212 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 16 May 2024
Caldwell and Timberstore v SSLUHC [2024] EWCA Civ 467
by Roderick Morton 26 April 2024
Ward v SSLUHC and Basildon District Council [2024] EWHC 676 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 22 March 2024
R oao Lisle-Mainwaring v RB Kensington and Chelsea and another
by Roderick Morton 13 February 2024
Southwood v Buckinghamshire Council [2024] EWHC 71 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 30 January 2024
s172ZA TCPA 1990
by Roderick Morton 26 October 2023
Ariyo v Richmond Upon Thames LBC [2023] EWHC 2278
Just what is the “streetscene” and the “character and appearance of an area”?
by Roderick Morton 28 September 2023
Kazalbash v SSLUHC and Hillingdon [2023] EWCA Civ 904
by Roderick Morton 7 August 2023
Removal of facilitating development
by Roderick Morton 19 July 2023
Pathfield Estates Ltd v LB Haringey [2023] EWHC 1790 (Admin)
by Roderick Morton 28 June 2023
Given its portrayal of the planning system so far, it is almost a given that season 3 of Clarkson’s Farm will not accurately present the detail of the Diddly Squat appeal decision. Here is our take. The decision is here. In summary, the LPA won almost all of the enforcement points. But simply being Jeremy Clarkson is apparently a material consideration which alters the planning balance! While he is popular, his celebrity is such that his farm shop will create significant problems beyond those of an ordinary farm shop and the inspector decided that these are problems which have already been accepted in granting his existing permission. Fewer of the harms to the AONB can therefore be attributed to the additional elements of the use. And these harms are outweighed by the economic benefits, benefits which are a result of his celebrity. So permission was granted for his farm shop and café and the associated parking and toilets. Clarkson’s popularity will be re-assessed in 3 years as the permission is time limited. Perhaps the inspector knows something we don’t. As viewers will know, Clarkson’s Farm operates in open countryside in an AONB. As well as agriculture, it has diversified to include a farm shop and a café in a lambing barn. The business tried to open a restaurant in a converted barn located some distance from the shop. The site is obviously used as a filming location. The business has proved popular and it now has significant parking and highway problems. The farm shop (with limited parking) has permission, the construction of the lambing barn (but not its use) has permission and there is permission for limited filming. The council enforced against the material change of use of the land to a mixed agricultural and leisure attraction use, comprising café, restaurant, gift/farm shop, parking and lavatory facilities. The notice was appealed. The appellant also sought (and was refused) permission for additional parking, access, storage and landscaping. This appeal was heard alongside the enforcement appeal. The inspector dealt first with the planning unit. The appellant alleged that there were three separate planning units (shop, café, restaurant), with each having a separate primary use. The council had enforced against a single unit in a mixed use. The inspector took into account that the shop/café was in a different ownership to the farm and that it had its own permission. But its activities clearly spilled out of the permitted area, extending to the proposed restaurant and the wider parking areas. The restaurant used the same parking as the shop. These were fenced/walled off from the remainder of the farm. He concluded that there was a single planning unit. As for the use of that planning unit, the inspector took issue with several items listed by the council. “Gift shop” was too ambiguous; a shop is a shop. Similarly, while visitors no doubt came for the experience, the business was not a “leisure attraction”. A leisure attraction required, said the inspector, something which the customer might be expected to pay for. There was no entrance fee here, just a shop and café. (It appears that the inspector was also concerned that any permission for a “leisure attraction” would create a very wide lawful use.) Nevertheless, there were several primary uses in a single unit so the development was a mixed use, in this case a “mixed use comprising agriculture, café, restaurant, farm shop, parking, lavatory facilities.” This put paid to the ground (b) and (c) challenges. The challenge was that the restaurant was a separate planning unit. As it was in the curtilage of the lawful farm shop, the appellant said that Class R permitted a change of use to a flexible use including a restaurant. In the light of his conclusion on the planning unit, the inspector rejected this. He said he would have rejected the Class R argument anyway as the restaurant was not clearly within the curtilage of the farm shop. The remainder of the uses cited in the notice were also challenged on the grounds that they were ancillary to the lawful farm shop use and not primary uses. The inspector concluded that, as the restaurant resulted in a mixed use, there had been a material change of use so it was irrelevant whether the other items were ancillary. As an aside, viewers of the series will recall the scripted glee with which the appellant came up with the “PD loophole” for his restaurant. It is fitting, therefore, that it was the restaurant which was the primary reason the breach was upheld. The inspector nevertheless looked at the extent to which the various alleged ancillary elements (other than the restaurant) were part of the lawful use prior to the breach. This was relevant to the fallback but also to what the extent of the material change of use truly was. He identified that the question was whether any of the elements represented a change in the character of the use. The inspector found that the level or vehicle traffic and parking went far beyond that for which permission had been given. And that the lambing shed was clearly not “by any stretch of reasonableness” being used for the purpose for which it was given permission. Even the toilet facilities went beyond what would be expected for the permitted farm shop. This was not intensification, it was a material change in the character of the use. The LPA even won the merits arguments on ground (a). The number of visitors, the traffic and parking problems, the outdoor seating, catering van and toilets clearly had an adverse effect on the AONB. The parking and landscaping proposed under the s78 application would have a similar effect. This had great weight. In the end though, permission was granted for the mixed use, including the use of the lambing shed as a café and the enforced against parking and toilets. Permission was granted under the s78 appeal for altered parking, storage and landscaping. Only the restaurant was refused. The inspector found that the parking would alleviate the current parking situation and highway safety even though it would not provide a complete solution. He accepted that a number of local suppliers benefited from trading arrangements with the shop and that the shop contributed to the local economy. He accepted that diversification was to be supported. These considerations also had great weight. Key to the decision, though, was the fact that permission had been granted, not just for a farm shop, but for a celebrity’s farm shop. Even if there was no café or restaurant, the popularity of the appellant was such that people would continue to visit the shop in numbers. This reduced to moderate the harm to the AONB caused by the new elements of the use because the permitted use already resulted in significant harm. The appellant’s celebrity might wane. In which case, the weight of the considerations in favour of the development would wane. The permission granted was therefore time limited to 36 months. The decision is well reasoned and fairly logical. The inspector did not say that the character of the use already permitted varied with the identity of the user. But the result seems to imply that the harms associated with the use could vary and that the LPA had accepted them all in granting permission. Yet it is difficult to think that the LPA could successfully have imposed conditions on the farm shop based on the identity of the applicant. The result is therefore troubling.
by Roderick Morton 17 May 2023
R oao Devonhurst Investments Ltd v Luton Borough Council [2023] EWHC 978 (Admin)